

Message Text

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EXDIS, MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, GR, TU

SUBJECT: MEETING OF COUNSELOR NIMETZ WITH GREEK MFA SECRE-
TARY GENERAL THEODOROPOULOS AND DIRECTOR GENERAL TZOUNIS

1. THEODOROPOULOS, TZOUNIS AND GREEK AMBASSADOR ALEXANDRA-
KIS CALLED ON COUNSELOR NIMETZ AT LATTER'S INVITATION MAY
31. THEODOROPOULOS BEGAN DISCUSSION BY INDICATING THAT
HIS GOVERNMENT IS DEEPLY WORRIED OVER US ACTIONS WHICH MAKE
IT APPEAR THAT A CHOICE IS BEING MADE BETWEEN GREECE AND
TURKEY. NIMETZ STATED THAT THIS IS A TOTALLY FALSE IM-
PRESSION. HE PERSONALLY COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW ANYONE
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COULD REACH THIS CONCLUSION. THE ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN
VERY CAREFUL TO BALANCE ITS PROGRAM AND ITS PUBLIC POSTURE
EVERY STEP OF THE WAY. WE HAD DECIDED TO ABANDON THE
TURKISH DCA, ONE REASON BEING THAT WE THOUGHT THIS WOULD
EASE GREECE'S SENSE OF SECURITY VIS-A-VIS TURKEY. WE HAD
GONE OUT OF OUR WAY TO ENSURE THAT OUR PACKAGE GAVE NO
PROVOCATION TO GREECE.

2. NIMETZ EXPLAINED THAT THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO WOULD NOT RESULT IN A MASSIVE FLOW OF ARMS TO TURKEY AND CONSEQUENTLY WOULD NOT HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON GREECE NOR ON THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE AREA. IN ANNOUNCING THIS PLAN WE HAD MADE A DETERMINED EFFORT TO BRIEF THE PRIME MINIS-

TER PERSONALLY, BUT THIS OFFER WAS DECLINED BY KARAMANLIS. IN OUR WRITTEN AND ORAL PRESENTATIONS TO THE CONGRESS WE HAVE AIMED AT BALANCE, GOING SO FAR AS TO GUARANTEE THAT THE SPACE GIVEN TO EACH COUNTRY WAS EQUAL. WHEN AVEROFF HAD ASKED THAT THE BITSIOS-KISSINGER AEGEAN SECURITY LANGUAGE BE INSERTED INTO THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, WE ACCOMMODATED THE GREEK REQUEST.

3. NIMETZ ALSO RECALLED THAT WE HAVE ALSO SPECIFICALLY INVITED GREEK SUGGESTIONS ON HOW WE CAN WORK TOGETHER TO DIMINISH ANY ADVERSE EFFECT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS MIGHT HAVE ON US-GREEK RELATIONS AND ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S DOMESTIC POSITION.

4. UNFORTUNATELY, NIMETZ CONTINUED, THE EMBARGO HAS COME TO DOMINATE THE US-GREEK RELATIONSHIP AND IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR THE GOVERNMENTS TO WORK TOGETHER IN A CREATIVE MANNER TO FIND WAYS TO IMPROVE US-GREEK TIES. GREECE'S EFFORTS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARD THIS END AND

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NOT GEARED TOWARD KEEPING US-TURKISH RELATIONS STRAINED. THE US IS WILLING TO CONSIDER ANY REASONABLE PROPOSALS, WHETHER THEY BE IN THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE FIELD, IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD OR IN ANY OTHER AREA WHERE THE GREEKS BELIEVE WE CAN BE HELPFUL.

5. NIMETZ STATED THAT THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES IF THE EMBARGO WERE NOT LIFTED. SUCH AN OUTCOME WOULD HEIGHTEN THE TURKISH SENSE OF ISOLATION AND COULD PRECIPITATE ACTIONS WHICH WOULD NOT BE BENEFICIAL TO GREECE'S INTERESTS. CERTAINLY IT WOULD RESULT IN A CONTINUING STALEMATE IN THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS. AND OF COURSE THE EMBARGO ISSUE WILL COME UP AGAIN NEXT YEAR AND CONTINUE TO PLAGUE US-GREEK RELATIONS. IT WAS NECESSARY TO GET THIS MATTER BEHIND US NOW.

6. THEODOROPOULOS RESPONDED BY POINTING OUT THAT PRIME MINISTER KARAMANLIS HAS BEEN VERY CAREFUL NOT TO TAKE A PUBLIC POSITION ON THE EMBARGO. HOWEVER, CERTAIN ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE ADMINISTRATION HAD FORCED THE PRIME MINISTER OUT INTO THE OPEN. FOR EXAMPLE, IN A RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BEFORE THE HIRC APRIL 6, THE SECRETARY HAD INDICATED

THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD NOT REACTED TO THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS. THIS FORCED A STATEMENT BY KARAMANLIS. ALSO, THE ADMINISTRATION'S CIRCULATION OF THE DENKTASH STATEMENT HAD CONVINCED GREEKS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS GOING ALL OUT TO PUSH THE TURKISH VIEWPOINT AND THAT THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF IMPARTIALITY LEFT. THIS MAKES THE PRIME MINISTER'S POSITION EVEN MORE DIFFICULT.

THESE INCIDENTS MAY HAVE BEEN A QUESTION OF TACTICS AND PRESENTATION, BUT IN GREECE IT HAS HAD A VERY NEGATIVE IMPACT. THEODOROPOULOS STRESSED THAT KARAMANLIS FEELS PARTICULARLY BETRAYED IN HIS EFFORTS TO BRING GREECE CLOSER TO THE WEST AND BACK INTO NATO. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP THE GREEKS WERE SEEKING WAS "SPECIAL" IN NAME ONLY AND IN CONFIDENTIAL

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FACT KARAMANLIS IS WORKING FOR AN "ALMOST TOTAL RETURN", BUT EVEN THESE EFFORTS ARE BEING THWARTED BY TURKEY AND SEEMINGLY BY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. HE LAMENTED THAT NO ONE IS GIVING SUPPORT OR SHOWING APPRECIATION FOR KARAMANLIS' EFFORTS TO MOVE GREECE CLOSER TO THE WEST.

7. TZOUNIS TURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS AND SAID THAT THE GREEKS WERE UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHY THESE PROPOSALS HAD BEEN SO LACKING IN SUBSTANCE. THEY SIMPLY DID NOT FORM A BASIS FOR A RESUMPTION OF THE TALKS BUT RATHER INSTITUTIONALIZED THE IMPASSE. CONSEQUENTLY, IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE GREEKS TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE US WAS DEFENDING THESE PROPOSALS AND PROMOTING THE DENKTASH STATEMENT WHICH CONTAINED, IN HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEW, NOTHING NEW.

8. NIMETZ TOLD TZOUNIS THAT WE HAD NEVER DEFENDED THE TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS NOR HAD WE SAID THAT IN THEMSELVES THEY CONTAINED THE ANSWER TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. RATHER THEY SHOULD BE TESTED AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WHERE IT COULD BE DETERMINED IF THE TURKISH SIDE WAS PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE. NIMETZ TOOK ISSUE WITH THE CONTENTION THAT THE DENKTASH STATEMENT OFFERED NOTHING NEW. FOR THE FIRST TIME, IT WAS EXPLICITLY STATED THAT 30,000-35,000 REFUGEES COULD RETURN TO NEW FAMAGUSTA. BEFORE, THE TURKS HAD TALKED ABOUT A FEW HOTEL-OWNERS RETURNING. NIMETZ STATED THAT IT CERTAINLY WOULD BE IN GREEK INTEREST TO GET GREEKS PHYSICALLY BACK INTO VAROSHA. IF THIS OPPORTUNITY IS LOST AND WE WAIT ANOTHER 4-5 YEARS FOR A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT, WE CANNOT BE SURE THAT NEW FAMAGUSTA WILL REMAIN EMPTY.

9. NIMETZ SAID THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THE TERRITORIAL NEEDS
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OF THE GREEK CYPRIOTS COULD BE GAINED AT THE TABLE. THE REAL PROBLEM WOULD COME WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE SETTLEMENT. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS FEAR DOMINATION BY THE GREEK CYPRIOT MAJORITY, AND WHILE THEY MAY SETTLE FOR A SMALL ZONE, THEY WILL FEEL THE NECESSITY OF BUILDING IN SUFFICIENT CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS.

10. THEODOROPOULOS SAID THAT IT REMAINS KARAMANLIS' POSITION THAT HE MUST HAVE SOMETHING CONVINCING TO USE WITH

THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AS AN INDUCEMENT TO GET THEM TO GO TO THE TABLE AND TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AND WITH FLEXIBILITY. THE PRESENT TURKISH CYPRIOT PROPOSALS SIMPLY WOULD NOT FILL THE BILL. AT MONTREUX KARAMANLIS HAD TOLD ECEVIT THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO HELP IF THE TURKISH SIDE CAME FORWARD WITH REASONABLE AND SERIOUS PROPOSALS.

11. NIMETZ SAID THAT IT WAS VERY DOUBTFUL THE TURKISH SIDE WOULD PUT FORWARD NEW PROPOSALS OR SIGNIFICANTLY MODIFY ANY FURTHER THE PRESENT ONES EXCEPT DURING RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS. IT WAS IN GREEK INTEREST TO TEST THEM AT THE TABLE. IN THIS REGARD, TZOUNIS AND NIMETZ AGREED THAT THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS DID NOT REALLY FACILITATE PROGRESS. TZOUNIS SAID THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT OBJECT TO EXPANDING UNSYG WALDHEIM'S MANDATE. THEODOROPOULOS STRESSED THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, CONTRARY TO WHAT MAY APPEAR, DO NOT SEE THE EMBARGO AS AN END IN ITSELF, AND THIS WAS EVEN LESS SO FOR GREECE.

12. FOLLOWING A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE NATO COMMUNIQUE AND ITS MENTION OF ALLIED SUPPORT FOR LIFTING THE EMBARGO, NIMETZ AGAIN STRESSED THE UNFORTUNATE WAY THE EMBARGO DOMINATES ALL ASPECTS OF US-GREEK, US-TURKISH, AND GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS. THE SQUABBLE WITHIN THE NATO CHAMBERS ABOUT THE EMBARGO LANGUAGE WAS YET ADDITIONAL PROOF THAT THE EMBARGO HAD TO BE REMOVED AS AN

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IRRITANT. NIMETZ RECALLED THAT THE APRIL MONTREUX FOLLOW-UP MEETING, A STRICTLY GREEK-TURKISH BILATERAL MATTER, HAD BEEN CANCELLED IN THE WAKE OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS ON LIFTING THE TURKISH EMBARGO. THIS DEMONSTRATED HOW THE EMBARGO ISSUE PERMEATES ALL ASPECTS OF EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ISSUES, WHETHER EXPLICITLY LINKED OR NOT.

13. TZOUNIS ASKED NIMETZ IF HE COULD STATE AUTHORITATIVELY THAT THERE WOULD BE POSITIVE RESULTS FLOWING FROM THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO. NIMETZ REGRETTED HE COULD OFFER NO GUARANTEES OTHER THAN THAT HE IS CERTAIN THINGS WILL ONLY GET WORSE IF THE EMBARGO IS NOT LIFTED.

14. TZOUNIS PROBED CONCERNING THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE US-GREEK DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT (DCA) IN LIGHT OF THE ANNOUNCED US INTENTION TO RENEGOTIATE THE US-TURKISH DCA. NIMETZ RESPONDED THAT IT WAS SOMETHING THAT WE WANTED TO DISCUSS IN DUE COURSE WITH THE GREEKS BUT THAT IT IS OUR PRELIMINARY VIEW THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MULTI-YEAR FINANCIAL CLAUSE, THE REMAINDER OF THE AGREEMENT AS IT STANDS IS ESSENTIALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE US. VANCE

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